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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 10 June 1993 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the nineteenth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Richard Hooper, for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

REPORT ON THE NINETEENTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)
30 April - 7 May 1993

**SALIENT POINTS**

- The nineteenth IAEA inspection in Iraq was devoted to the spring collection of surface water samples, to follow-up activities related to the verification of the Iraqi January 1993 Annex 3 equipment declarations and to various monitoring activities. A total of 33 sites or establishments were visited in the course of this inspection.

- Part of the long term monitoring effort in Iraq involves the periodic radiometric survey of the main water bodies in Iraq. This requires the collection of surface water, sediment and biota samples. Fifteen locations along the Tigris-Euphrates watershed were sampled.

- Activities aimed at verifying new information provided by the Iraqi side in their January 1993 Annex 3 declarations were carried out at a number of sites. The work is a continuation of the effort begun during IAEA-18. A number of establishments, visited for the first time by a nuclear team, were inspected for the specific purpose of verifying the completeness of the Annex 3 declarations. No UNSC 687 proscribed activities or undeclared Annex 3 relevant equipment were discovered.

- During an IAEA-18 inspection of workshops at the Al Hatteen Establishment, a large number (242) of CNC machine tools were seen for the first time. None of the machines had been identified in the Iraqi Annex 3 declaration. The opinion of the inspection team was that more than a third of the machines (94 series-3 or -4 CNC turning machines manufactured by Matrix Churchill), according to reporting requirements previously communicated to the Iraqi side, should have been declared pending a more detailed technical evaluation. The Iraqi position was that the machines did not meet the technical specifications of Annex 3 and therefore they felt no obligation to declare them. This disagreement is not limited to the Matrix Churchill

machine tools discovered at Al Hatteen. Inspection teams have seen and, over objections from the Iraqi side, sealed for identification an additional 54 CNC Matrix Churchill turning machines located at other State Establishments. Only a few of these additional machine tools were included in the Annex 3 declarations.

Machine tool experts, bolstered with specific technical information obtained prior to IAEA-19, carried out a detailed technical evaluation of a number of Matrix Churchill machine tools located at Al Hatteen and other establishments. The conclusion of this work is that, of the 148 Matrix Churchill machine tools so far inventoried by inspection teams in Iraq, 144 do not meet the specifications of Annex 3. Judgement is withheld on 4 specific machines pending accuracy measurements planned for a future inspection.

This conclusion applies only to those Matrix Churchill machine tools that have actually been seen by inspection teams. It does not apply to any Matrix Churchill machines that may exist in Iraq which have not yet been declared or inspected. There are, in fact, indications suggesting that more than 148 CNC Matrix Churchill turning machines have been exported to Iraq and some of them may meet the specifications of Annex 3. Until this procurement issue is settled, the monitoring of the Matrix Churchill machine tools will continue to be part of the IAEA inspection efforts.

## INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the results of the nineteenth inspection mission carried out in Iraq by the IAEA under the United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991), with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The mission took place from 30 April to 7 May 1993 and was headed by Mr. Richard Hooper of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. The team consisted of 14 inspectors (comprising 8 nationalities) and support staff.

2. The objectives of the mission were:

   - the collection of surface water, sediment and biota samples at selected locations along the Tigris-Euphrates watersheds in the context of the periodic radiometric survey of the main water bodies of Iraq. This work is a continuing part of the monitoring effort in Iraq;

   - to continue the process, begun during IAEA-18, of verifying information provided by the Iraqi side in their January 1993 Annex 3 equipment and materials declaration;

   - to carry out inspections at selected sites not previously visited by a nuclear team for the purpose of verifying the completeness of the Iraqi Annex 3 declarations;

   - to carry out monitoring inspections at sites previously visited.

3. Inspection activities were carried out at 33 sites or establishments. These are listed in Table 1.

## Table 1

## List of Sites/Establishments Inspected

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. | Tuwaitha, including Locations B and C |
| 2. | Ash Shakyli storage |
| 3. | Al Nafad storage |
| 4-8 | Baghdad Military Installation at Taji and four separate establishments |
| 9. | Nassr State Establishment |
| 10. | Al Hatteen Establishment |
| 11. | Iskandariya car and tractor factories |
| 12. | Al Nidaa (used to be Al Rabiya) |
| 13. | Um Al Maarik (used to be Auqba bin Nafi State Establishment) |
| 14. | Badr State Establishment |
| 15. | Al Furat project site |
| 16. | Al Nassariya (Ur State Establishment) |
| 17. | Schuala (subsidiary of Nassr State Establishment) |
| 18. | Al Qaim fertilizer plant |
| 19-33 | Fifteen sites indicated in Figure 1 and Table 2, where water, sediment and biota samples were taken |

**ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE RADIOMETRIC HYDROLOGIC SURVEY**

4. During IAEA-14 (September 1992) and IAEA-15 (November 1992), a radiometric survey of the surface waters of Iraq was carried out. Water, sediment and biota samples were collected at 52 locations along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, their major tributaries and selected lake basins. The objectives of the survey were the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the establishment of a baseline for the longer term monitoring programme.

5. The IAEA's monitoring programme for Iraq includes the periodic radiometric survey of surface waters. Current plans are to monitor water bodies twice a year. The first of these periodic samplings was carried out during IAEA-19. A total of fifteen sites were sampled. The sample collection sites are indicated in Figure 1. Sample collection procedures were described in the IAEA-15 inspection report. The results from each sample analysis will be compared to the previously established base line.

**ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS**

6. The evaluation of machine tools in Iraq vis a vis the reporting requirements contained in Annex 3 of the IAEA's long term monitoring plan has proven to be a difficult problem. Some machine tools clearly fall within the Annex 3 specifications, while others, just as clearly, do not. However, there is a large number of machine tools in Iraq where the judgement requires a detailed technical assessment of drive and feedback control mechanisms, information from the manufacturer and possibly accuracy measurements.

The performance of many machine tools in Iraq has been degraded by war damage, multiple movements in an attempt to prevent further war damage and poor working conditions and maintenance. However, the performance of individual machines can be improved through refurbishment and compensations for systematic errors by appropriate programming of the computer numerical controller (CNC). Information from the manufacturer regarding the performance capabilities of the machines, as delivered, is most important since the assessment of a machine tool must be mostly based on the capability it had when it was exported to Iraq.

## Table 2

**Sample collection sites for the Spring 1993 Radiometric Survey of Iraq's Surface Waters**

| Name of the location | Region No. | Corresponding number on the map |
|---|---|---|
| Dora Expressway bridge | 6 | 6b |
| Euphrates - Al Musayyib | 10 | 10g |
| Route 6 Highway bridge | 9 | 9a |
| Al Hadar | 8 | 8a |
| Intersection Tigris canal/Tartar lake canal | 5 | 5g |
| Diyala weyr | 9 | 9b |
| North of Kuwayr | 3 | 3b |
| Sharqat | 1 | 1b |
| Tigris | 2 | 2a |
| North of Samarra | 1 | 1d |
| Confluence Nahr al Uzaym-Tigris | 7 | 7a |
| Pontoon bridge | 6 | 6c |
| Third river | 10 | 10d |
| Shatt Nahr Al Gharraf | 10 | 10c |
| Al Kut | 10 | 36 |

**Figure 1**

**Sample collection sites for the Spring 1993 Radiometric Survey of Iraq's Surface Waters**

7. Prior to IAEA-18, 54 Matrix Churchill machine tools had been seen by IAEA inspection teams in Iraq. These machines, depending upon their condition (some are destroyed), were sealed for identification pending a detailed examination of their performance capabilities. The Iraqi side objected to this practice, arguing that the machines do not meet the specifications of Annex 3. Instructions to the Iraqi side were that they were to report all such machine tools existing in Iraq (as of 1 January 1989), together with their objections, in the Annex 3 declaration. The January 1993 Annex 3 declaration covered only a few of the 54 Matrix Churchill machines seen by inspection teams. The IAEA Action Team for Iraq had received indications that the numbers of Matrix Churchill machine tools delivered to Iraq were far in excess of the 54 units identified up until January 1993.

8. In the course of IAEA-18 in March 1993, an additional 94 CNC Matrix Churchill turning machines were discovered during an inspection of workshops at the Al Hatteen State Establishment. These machines had not been listed in the Iraqi Annex 3 declaration. This matter was reported in detail in the IAEA-18 inspection report. The Iraqi side again contended that they were under no obligation to declare these machines, because they did not meet the technical specifications of Annex 3.

9. An objective of the IAEA-19 inspection was to resolve the issue regarding the Matrix Churchill machine tools. Two machine tool experts, both with previous inspection experience in Iraq, were included in the inspection team. Inspection activities specific to this issue included:

- a visit to the Al Hatteen Establishment where examples of the series 3, 4/15 and 7/48 machines were opened and examined in detail. Of particular interest was the fact that the design and location of the axis position feedback device (the "encoder") on many of these machines is not consistent with the type of precision machines covered in Annex 3.

- A similar visit was carried out at the Nassr State establishment at Taji. Selected examples of the series 3 Matrix Churchill machines were examined. In

addition the Iraqi side demonstrated a 2-axis displacement test using slip blocks and a dial indicator to measure linear accuracy which resulted to be outside the specifications of Annex 3. This method is not as precise as the one with a laser interferometer, but the experts judged the results to be acceptable.

- Three technical meetings on the Matrix Churchill machines were held during the inspection. Two of the meetings involved the Director Generals and senior technical personnel from the State establishments where Matrix Churchill machines were located. The Iraqi side described the circumstances under which they obtained the machines during a difficult time in the Iran-Iraq war, when high spindle capacity was badly needed for the manufacturing of artillery shells. As long as the machines were adequate, accuracy was a secondary consideration. The technical discussions were extensive.

10. The conclusion of the inspection team, discussed at length with the experts and the IAEA Iraq Action Team following the inspection, is that 144 of the 148 Matrix Churchill machines do not now meet the specifications of Annex 3. The remaining 4 machines, because of a particular controller and encoder configuration, require further evaluation. This conclusion pertains only to the Matrix Churchill machines seen by inspection teams. It does not include Matrix Churchill CNC machines which may exist in Iraq that have not been declared or seen. There are indications suggesting that more than 148 CNC Matrix Churchill turning machines have been exported to Iraq and some of them may meet the specifications of Annex 3. Until this procurement issue is settled, the monitoring of the Matrix Churchill machine tools will continue to be part of the IAEA inspection effort.

11. Facing the eastern boundaries of the Nassr State Establishment at Taji, on the right side of the Baghdad-Mosul highway, is a large military complex known as the Baghdad Military Installation at Taji. This site had been visited several times by UN Special Commission ballistic teams in view of its past connection with the missile programme (Project 144). Part of the complex was visited by Agency inspectors in the

course of IAEA-2, IAEA-7 and IAEA-15. The area previously occupied by project 144 activities and the southern part of the site are completely destroyed and remain unchanged. The IAEA-19 team toured the whole complex and checked all major buildings. The installation is partitioned into a number of separate establishments mainly utilized for maintenance and repair of military equipment, heavy vehicles and earth moving equipment. The establishments have no manufacturing capability and repairs are made using salvaged parts. Several modest mechanical workshops equipped with machine tools were seen, but none of these were CNC type or capable of high precision. No other Annex 3 relevant equipment of interest was seen nor any special feature was noted in any of the buildings.

12. The large military-industrial complex at Iskandariya adjacent to the Al Hatteen ammunition plant, included two factories originally built for the production of tractors and buses/trucks respectively. The tractor production factory is in operation, while activity at the second factory is limited to repair work. IAEA-19 verified machine tools and other equipment of these two factories. With the exception of an horizontal flow forming machine (seen and reported in a previous inspection), no machine tools or other equipment relevant to Annex 3 was seen.

13. A detailed inspection was carried out at the Ur establishment in the vicinity of Nassariya, circa. 350 km south east of Baghdad. Ur is a large aluminium production factory where previous inspection teams had verified stocks of preformed high strength aluminium components procured for the Iraq centrifuge programme and melted in the foundry of this complex when the decision was taken to destroy evidence of this procurement. The IAEA-19 team completed a detailed inspection of this factory and verified the functions and the equipment of the main buildings. The following are currently the main production lines at Nassariya:

- Production of aluminium window frames and aluminium foil by recycling aluminium scraps;

- Production of copper and aluminium wire; and

- Production of cables for power supplies and telecommunications.

Each building was exactly as explained and equipment and machine tools were of a common variety for the work being performed. Further inspections and monitoring is needed in connection with the melts and scraps of high strength aluminium existing at this site.

14. The Iraqi Annex 3 declarations contain a number of pieces of equipment in Tuwaitha - buildings 9, 82 and 90 - and at the Ash Shakyli warehouses. The IAEA-18 team had started verifying and tagging this equipment and had also initiated a systematic updating of the materials and equipment stored in the Ash Shakyli warehouse. The IAEA-19 team was mandated to complete the job at Tuwaitha and Ash Shakyli. All items declared under Annex 3 at Tuwaitha were identified and recorded with the exception of a pulse generator and a timer which were declared but not found. The Iraqi side will look for these two items and present them to the next inspection team. A complete inventory of the 25 warehouses at Ash Shakyli was drawn. At Tuwaitha, new samples of tree trunks were taken in different locations to complete a tritium survey aimed at identifying activities prohibited under resolution 687 (1991).

15. The Al Nidaa (formerly Al Rabiya) Establishment was visited on 27 January 1993 by the IAEA-17 inspection team, just ten days after the facility had been destroyed by a cruise missile attack. At that time, the Iraqi side was involved in a massive reconstruction effort. The reconstruction effort was reported as largely complete at the time of IAEA-18. Today the facility has been turned into a showcase - all destroyed buildings are nicely finished inside and out, the new administration building is occupied, the whole area is landscaped, monuments (including recovered scraps from cruise missiles) have been erected and an exhibition centre that documents the whole reconstruction is a required stop for all visitors. The purpose of the inspection was to update the equipment inventory for the facility.

Most of the machine tools and equipment were reinstalled in the workshop buildings. The locations of the machine tools are changed from the previous inventory which had been taken last year. Many of the machine tools have been repaired. A detailed inventory of machine tools was taken during the visit and changes in the specific functions of some buildings have been noted.

A vacuum plasma spray system was declared under Annex 3 requirements at Al Nidaa. It could not be located at Al Nidaa in previous inspections because it had been removed prior to the 17 January 1993 cruise missile strike at Al Nidaa. It was agreed that this equipment would be returned to Al Nidaa to be shown to the IAEA-19 team. This visit took place on the last inspection day. The plasma spray system (PLASMA TECHNIK AG) was still dismantled in many sections and photographic records were taken of all components and ancillaries.

16. Short inspections with the objective of completing activities initiated in the course of previous inspections were conducted by the IAEA-19 team at the Badr State Establishment and at Auqba bin Nafi. At Badr the IAEA-19 team made a detailed review of the equipment and machine tools of the plant which manufactures tungsten carbide tooling bits and could confirm that this equipment and the machine tools are not Annex 3 relevant. While in Badr, a check was made on items sealed in the course of previous inspections. All seals were intact and the storage conditions remained unchanged.

At Auqba bin Nafi (new name: the Um Al Maarik Establishment), the objective of the visit was to check the possibility of using photo surveillance techniques to monitor the utilization of four large diameter milling and boring machines located in building 119. A detailed map of the building with indications of the individual machine location has been prepared for the future installation of surveillance devices.

**OTHER ACTIVITIES**

17. Al Furat project site (see Figure 2) - This site was being developed by the Iraqi side as a centrifuge manufacturing and test facility when work stopped at the time of the Gulf War. According to an Iraqi statement, the site had originally been a training centre with dormitories, cafeteria and training hall to which three new buildings (B01, B02 and B03) were being added when the conversion to a centrifuge manufacturing and testing facility was decided. Building B03 - a raw materials store - was complete and buildings B01 and B02 were in the early stages of construction when work stopped. All other buildings go back to the training centre application, although building B00 (the main training hall) was being modified.

When the IAEA-19 team arrived for the inspection, they found a large workforce busy reconfiguring and refurbishing the pre-existing buildings. The Iraqi counterpart indicated that the facility now belongs to the Military Industrial Committee (MIC) and that they were preparing it for some use, but he did not know what it was. The team proceeded to walk through every building on the site. Buildings B01, B02 and B03 (i.e. those buildings added for the centrifuge programme), with the exception of scavenging for building materials, are untouched. All other buildings are being modified and refurbished. By all appearances, the site is being converted into an office complex. Even the large halls in B00 are being partitioned into halls and office size cubicles. The same is true of the former barracks indicated as B05 and B06. The site has the possibility for a large power supply. Thirteen transformer bays were counted. Only one had a transformer installed (1000 kVA), but two additional 1000 kVA and one 630 kVA transformer are available for installation. Probably the potential power supply relates to the centrifuge manufacturing application, but those buildings were being refurbished along with the rest. The utilities, ventilation, etc., being installed in buildings B00, B05 and B06 are modest. The Iraqi counterpart was requested to provide the team with a written explanation of the planned use of the facility before the team's departure. A reply was received two days later, at the time the team was leaving Baghdad. This matter which needs further clarification (Attachm.1), will be pursued during the next inspection.

18. Al Qaim phosphate plant - The purpose of the inspection at Al Qaim was to assure that the $UO_4$ and associated equipment remain as it was and that no attempts are being made to recover uranium from the phosphate ore. The yellow cake ($UO_4$) plant was destroyed during the Gulf War and it remains unchanged since the last inspection. The process for production of $UO_4$ is a loop in the phosphoric acid production process. The chemical processing of the uranium bearing phosphate ore yields a dilute, uranium containing, phosphoric acid solution. After filtration and prior to concentration, this dilute solution was sent to a separate plant to recover the uranium. The raffinate was then sent back to the main plant where the dilute phosphoric acid solution, which did not contain any more uranium, was concentrated and converted into a phosphate fertilizer. The processing of the dilute phosphoric acid for recovery of uranium, including additional purification, oxidation and selective precipitation, was, according to Iraqi authorities' statements, stopped when the $UO_4$ plant was bombed. The pipe that runs from the phosphoric acid plant to the $UO_4$ plant was destroyed. Inspectors took a sample of the dilute phosphoric acid after the filtration cycle and a second sample of the concentrated phosphoric acid product as it is sent to the fertilizer plant. A highly sensitive radiation detector was used to examine the contents of a number of storage tanks and pipe runs. In all cases the Iraqi side's description of the use of this equipment was consistent with the detector's readings. Samples will be analyzed in the Agency's laboratories to confirm that the uranium has not been separated and is now present as an impurity in the plant product.

19. Ash Sukhayr - This is the site of a carbonate ore mine that the Iraqi side was attempting to exploit as an indigenous source of uranium. The ore reportedly contained ~150ppm uranium and the Geologic Institute, Baghdad was working on a process for uranium recovery. According to a source at the mine, work stopped at this location in mid-1990. This site is now totally abandoned and the modest equipment is encrusted with a heavy layer of rust. The mine shaft, ~75m deep with a horizontal shaft extending ~100m is flooded. Several large piles of ore removed from the mine are situated close by. The Agency will recommend that the extracted ore be dumped back to fill and close the mine shaft.

**FIGURE 2. THE AL FURAT PROJECT SITE**




**Note: Captions describe buildings planned utilization as declared by the Iraqi authorities to the IAEA-19 team. No details are yet available on the intended future use of Buildings B00, B01, B02, B03 and B07.**

ATTACHMENT 1

93-10724 (1214n/0084n)
Translated from Arabic

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
Baghdad

No.: N 16 6 May 1993

Subject: Furat site

Sir,

The Furat site was handed over to the Military Industry Committee, as indicated in the tables showing the sites which had belonged to and supported the nuclear programme. These tables were transmitted to the IAEA on 21 April 1993.

At present the Committee is modernizing the site and putting it back into operation for one of its organizational units. There is a preliminary proposal that this site should be occupied by the Research and Development Committee.

Yours, etc.,

(signed) Abdul Halim Ibrahim Al-Hajjaj
Head, Iraqi Inspection Team

Head, Nineteenth Nuclear Inspection Team
IAEA, Vienna

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 16 June 1993 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

United Nations Security Council resolution 699 (1991), approved on 17 June 1991, requests - inter alia - the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council progress reports on the implementation of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Such reports are to be submitted every six months after the adoption of the resolution and the fourth report is therefore due on 17 June 1993.

Please find attached an outline of the activities carried out by the Agency during the past six months under the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, which you might find useful for the preparation of your report.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

# Fourth semi-annual report (covering the period 17 December 1992 - 17 June 1993) on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

## INTRODUCTION

By resolution 699 of 17 June 1991, the Security Council approved the plan submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through the Secretary-General, for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items listed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Resolution 699 also called for the Secretary-General to submit every six months a progress report on the implementation of the plan.

The first of these reports was circulated by the Secretary-General to the members of the Security Council in document S/23295 dated 17 December 1991, the second in document S/24110 dated 17 June 1992 and the third in document S/24988 dated 17 December 1992.

This is the fourth semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for destruction, removal or rendering harmless covering the period from 17 December 1992 to 17 June 1993. During this period, the IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission of the UN, conducted three on-site inspections in Iraq (IAEA-17, IAEA-18 and IAEA-19), detailed reports of which have been distributed to the Security Council[1].

## PRESENT STATUS

As of 17 June 1993 the IAEA has carried out, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, 19 missions in Iraq. These missions have entailed inspections at seventy-five sites and have resulted in the gradual disclosure of a broadly-based nuclear programme

[1]Document S/25411 (IAEA-17) and document S/25666 (IAEA-18). The IAEA-19 report was sent to the UN Secretary-General for submission to the Security Council, on 10 June 1993.

aimed at the production of enriched uranium and at the development of nuclear weapon capabilities. As a result of these inspections, in the course of which the IAEA has interviewed numerous Iraqi authorities and secured thousands of pages of documents, the IAEA has been able to draw a reasonably coherent and consistent picture of Iraq's nuclear programme. However, doubts remain as to whether the picture is complete.

Efforts to implement the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of all items referred to in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) are on-going. The IAEA has supervised extensive destruction of facilities and equipment related to the production of enriched uranium and to the weaponization programme. Key buildings and equipment have been demolished by Iraqi personnel at the direction of the IAEA inspection teams, resulting in the destruction of the Al Atheer, Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites. All nuclear-related production facilities at Al Jezira and Al Qaim had been destroyed during the Gulf War and the Tuwaitha Centre was badly damaged. With regard to nuclear-weapons-usable material, the only such material currently known to remain in Iraq is the highly enriched uranium in irradiated reactor fuel assemblies, removal of which from Iraq awaits conclusion of the necessary arrangements with recipient countries. The material has been verified by non destructive measurements and is being kept under seal until its removal. In addition, numerous other materials, equipment and components have been either destroyed, removed from Iraq or placed under Agency seal in Iraq and are subjected to regular verification. The details of the activities relevant to destruction, removal or rendering harmless carried out since the third report submitted by the Director General are set out below.

Direct-Use Material

Fresh fuel

As indicated in the second and third reports, all of the fresh fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor has been transferred to Russia and transformed, through isotopic dilution, into uranium enriched to slightly less than 20% in U235. This material has been transferred from the processing plant to a storage facility in Russia, where it will remain under IAEA safeguards

pending its resale. The French-origin MTR type plates and the Russian-origin pins which were removed from Iraq in June 1992 remain in storage at the IAEA Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria.

Irradiated fuel

As indicated in the second and third reports, negotiations with a consortium of commercial companies from France and the UK for the removal, transportation and disposal of this fuel had met with difficulties of a legal, technical and financial nature. Therefore, the IAEA issued on 27 November 1992 a new request for proposals for the removal, transportation and disposal of the material in question. The request for proposal was sent to the Governments of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. By the closing date for the receipt of proposals, only one proposal from CIR-Minatom, an arm of the Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy, had been received. This Russian offer included provision for the removal of the irradiated fuel from Iraq to Russia, reprocessing to recover and isotopically dilute the enriched uranium, and conditioning and permanent storage in Russia of the resulting wastes.

While the final price still remains to be negotiated, every measure has been taken by the Agency and the UN to limit the cost involved and to reduce uncertainties that might lead to cost overruns. Discussions have also been held with the Iraqi authorities to identify in every possible detail the extent of local support needed in Iraq in terms of manpower, equipment and services. Although technically feasible, in full compliance will all relevant safety standards, the packing and removal operations alone are already a major endeavor that will require not less than six months from its commencement until the last fuel element is removed from Iraq. During this time, contractor and Agency personnel will have to stay in Iraq to supervise and direct all operations. The reprocessing of the fuel and the conditioning and permanent storage of the resulting wastes will account for a significant portion of the cost of the contract. If sufficient funds are made available, the contract could be signed - and work could start - in a matter of weeks.

Plutonium and Other Nuclear Material

A primary and continuing objective of the IAEA inspections in Iraq is the verification of the correctness and completeness of Iraqi nuclear material declarations. The nuclear materials subject to safeguards inspection prior to the Gulf War are long since accounted for. None of the safeguarded enriched nuclear material had been diverted to the clandestine programme. With the exception of small quantities of natural uranium still to be recovered from waste at the Al Jezira site, all declared bulk uranium stock and intermediate process materials (a total of 550 t uranium) have been verified by chemical analysis and are maintained under seal at a single location. Most of this material, in the form of yellow cake, - about one-fifth declared after the Gulf War to have come from indigenous production and four-fifths from external sources - had not been included in the pre-war safeguards inspection regime.

It is not possible to establish the completeness of Iraqi nuclear material declarations through traditional material accountancy. Efforts to independently confirm quantities of nuclear material not subject to safeguards inspection (much of it in the form of yellow cake delivered to Iraq by external sources) have not been successful. Further, while daily production records for the Al Qaim facility (which produced such material indigenously) have been presented and reviewed by inspection teams, there is no way to verify the completeness of these records. Considerable effort has been expended in an attempt to develop an internally consistent picture of how quantities of nuclear material from the different origins had been utilized. This origin-based accountancy has been largely an effort to match inspection team-measured material, presented in various physical and chemical forms, with Iraqi descriptions of material flows through the declared processes. The matching of quantities of material with the respective origins is carried out through highly precise isotopic and impurity measurements. The resulting picture does not provide assurance that all nuclear materials have been declared and presented, but the resulting inconsistencies do provide a technical basis and direction for further investigation.

The Iraqi nuclear material flow chart changed considerably between the time it was first presented and the time that the "full, final and complete" declaration was submitted. The

various revisions in the nuclear material flow chart were made by the Iraqi side in response to inconsistencies identified by inspection teams. With the "full, final and complete" declaration of June 1992, the Iraqi response to remaining inconsistencies was that "any differences in weights existing in the chart of nuclear material as verified by the Agency are attributed to either losses of the material during the bombing or mixing of the material during the evacuation or the inaccuracy of the analysis of the samples". Iraqi authorities reported that they now considered that the "nuclear material file is closed" and have declined to provide further clarification. The Agency has consistently rejected this position.

An accumulation of sample analysis data from precise measurements of uranium isotopics and impurities in selected samples are now casting doubt on major elements of the Iraqi side's nuclear material declarations. The declarations in question involve the activities, identified as the "30 July Project", carried out in the building 73 complex at Tuwaitha and a large quantity of $UO_2$ reportedly imported from Brazil. A description of the specific declarations and the verification findings follows:

Declaration: Building 73a was involved in a variety of fuel fabrication activities utilizing 2,260 kgs of natural uranium ($UO_2$) from Italy (safeguarded material) and 59 kgs of natural uranium ($UO_4$) from Akashat/Al Qaim (non-safeguarded material). Thirty-seven air filters containing ~ 50 kg of natural uranium, currently stored under IAEA seal at Location C, were declared to have been installed in building 73a. In addition, waste associated with the activities of buildings 73a and 73b was presented to the IAEA for verification.

Verification Findings: The natural concentration of the uranium isotope U-234 is constant within a single uranium ore deposit, but highly variable across geographical separate ore bodies (see for example L.U. Joski, et al. J. Radioanal. Chem., 67 (1981) 47 and 79 (1983) 317). Figure 1 shows U-234/U-235 isotopic ratio measurements for 3 samples of the Italian $UO_2$, 3 samples of the Akashat/Al Qaim $UO_4$, samples from 8 of the 37 air filters declared to have been installed in building 73a and 2 samples of waste slurry identified with building 73a activities. The results shown in Figure 1, with further confirmation provided by the impurity analyses, contradict the Iraqi side's declaration that the bulk of the

material utilized in building 73a was of Italian origin. Either the filters had been installed elsewhere than declared (the Iraqi side has indicated that there was no filtration system in building 73c), or the activities carried out in building 73a involved extensive and undeclared utilization of material other than, or in addition to, the Italian $UO_2$. It is possible that the additional material processed in building 73a had been associated with the Iraqi uranium metallurgy programme and this could indicate a greater quantity of material involved in the violation of the safeguards agreement that was disclosed at the time of the eleventh mission.

Declaration: Iraq had received 23.5 tonnes of natural uranium as $UO_2$ from Brazil. A quantity amounting to 3.4 tonnes of that material had been processed for the enrichment programme. The remaining 20.1 tonnes, contained in 201 drums, was never processed.

Verification Findings: The total quantity of uranium verified as contained in the 201 drums is 18.2 tonnes, not the 20.1 tonnes declared. Moreover, when the randomly selected drums were opened for sampling, inspectors noted that material was present in three distinctly different physical forms:

- fine powder;
- granulated material; and
- a mixture of the granulated material and powder.

The Brazilian uranium originates from thorium bearing ores and, as such, should contain traces of thorium. Impurity analyses indicate that the granulated material contains significant amounts of thorium, while the fine powder contains no thorium. In fact, the broader analytical results suggest that the fine powder is Iraqi $UO_2$ produced at Al Jezira. During the eighteenth inspection, every one of the 201 drums was opened and the physical form of the material noted. An additional 16 samples were collected. Preliminary results suggest that at least two-thirds of the material presented as Brazilian $UO_2$ was of some other origin.

The verification data concerning the building 73a filters and the Brazilian $UO_2$ were discussed at length with the Iraqi authorities. They indicated that they could not dispute the results, but could offer no explanation either. They reiterated at length that all nuclear materials in Iraq had been declared and presented. The Iraqi responses to the IAEA's requests for clarifications were along the lines presented by Iraq in connection with the full, final and complete declaration, indicating that part of the material had been recovered under difficult circumstances and that some mixing had been unavoidable. This matter will be further pursued in future inspections.

Installations, equipment and other materials relevant to enriched uranium production and to weaponization activities

In accordance with paragraph 22 of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of part C of the Security Council resolution 687 (1991), contained in document S/22872/Rev. 1/Corr. 1, Iraq is obliged to declare to the IAEA items subject to the plan and to provide, inter alia, an inventory of all material, equipment and other items in Iraq identified in Annex 3 of the plan.

The items in the Annex include those specifically prohibited under resolution 687 (1991) i.e. those items which have to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless, as well as others which may be prohibited, depending on their use or intended use, or subject to monitoring under the plan.

In document S/25621 of 19 April 1993, the Security Council was informed of the Agency's repeated efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the requirements of the plan's Annex 3 declaration.

At the end of the seventeenth inspection, the Iraqi authorities provided the IAEA team a revised list of Annex 3 items which Iraq described as covering the period from 1 January 1989 and including all Annex 3 items which existed or had existed in IAEC facilities, universities and State Establishments which supported the IAEC programme. However, the Iraqi

FIGURE 1

U-234/U-235 Isotopic Ratios for Materials Associated with Building 73a




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counterparts reserved the right to include items which might have been omitted from the list, either through oversight or because they were not thought to be covered by Annex 3, in the next update, which is to be submitted in July 1993.

Verification of the correctness and completeness of the new Annex 3 list, started in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth inspections, will need still some time for completion. Details of this verification are described in the eighteenth inspection report (S/25666) and the nineteenth inspection report (submitted to the Security Council on 10 June 1993).

FUTURE ACTIONS

As indicated above, the removal from Iraq of a quantity of U235 contained in irradiated fuel elements remains one of the major outstanding actions. Priority should be given to concluding this action as promptly as possible.

Efforts to reconcile the major inconsistencies identified by the inspection teams in the nuclear material flow chart submitted by the Iraqi authorities, have not yet been successful. Discrepancies continue to exist between the Iraqi declarations and the IAEA's findings. This matter will be pursued in future inspections.

Following the January 1993 submission by Iraq of the revised Annex 3 list of the IAEA plan for future ongoing monitoring of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, verification of the correctness and completeness of this list will continue.

As indicated in the IAEA's third semi-annual report on these activities (document S\25621), additional destruction, removal or rendering harmless may be necessary.

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**UNITED NATIONS** **S**

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25984
22 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that, taking advantage of internal political tension in Azerbaijan, Armenian armed forces have sharply stepped up their military activities in Agdam and Agdere districts of the Azerbaijani Republic.

As a result of the week-long fighting and the continuous rocket artillery shelling, half of the town of Agdam has been destroyed. The surrounding villages were burnt to the ground and pillaged. Around 100 civilians were killed and the majority of the inhabitants have been evacuated. During the offensive by the Armenian armed formations, eight settlements in Agdam district were occupied (Ablad, Gyulably, Azhinli, Aliagaly, Alimaatly, Mollalan, Galaichilor and Bashinlar).

Tension also persists in the vicinity of the district centre of Agdere, where there is an ongoing build-up of Armenian forces and military equipment which have been channelled from Armenia through the occupied Kelbajar district.

By these military actions, the Armenian side has once again shown that it has no intention of complying with Security Council resolution 822 (1993) or the schedule of urgent measures proposed by the nine countries of the Minsk Group.

In this connection I request you, Sir, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to call upon the authorities of the Republic of Armenia to comply strictly with Security Council resolution 822 (1993), of 29 April 1993, and to demand that the Republic of Armenia desist immediately from its military activities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a lasting cease-fire and securing the immediate withdrawal of all the occupying forces from the territory which Armenia has seized from Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25985
22 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

# LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters, the most recent of which was that circulated in document S/25916, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft and aircraft of the Western coalition have dropped heat flares on a number of areas of Iraq, as set forth below.

1. At 1130 on 12 May 1993, two hostile aircraft dropped three heat flares on the township and district of Kawir in the Irbil Governorate.

2. At 1400 on 24 May 1993, aircraft of the Western coalition dropped heat flares on agricultural land in the Jifjafiyah area of the Iskandariyah district causing fire damage.

3. At 1415 hours on 5 June 1993, a number of United States aircraft dropped heat flares in the cultivated area near the Tall Kayf district of the Ninawa Governorate.

4. At 2102 hours on 8 June 1993, two United States aircraft dropped a heat flare on the Hawr al-Rumayd area in the Islah district of Dhi Qar Governorate.

5. At 1515 hours on 13 June 1993, a United States aircraft dropped heat flares on farms at the villages of Khutayah and Shahrzad in the Ninawa Governorate. One hundred and forty dunums of barley and 260 dunums of wheat were burnt, and damage was estimated at more than 500,000 dinars.

That United States aircraft and aircraft of the Western coalition are continuing to drop heat flares provides further evidence of the insistence of the United States and the Western coalition on causing injury to Iraq and its people and on encroaching on its security and sovereignty.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq protests in the strongest terms against these acts of aggression and requests you to intervene and to take the measures required under the Charter of the United Nations to halt them and prevent their future repetition.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan MALIK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/217
S/25986
22 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Items 42 and 115 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 21 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose the text of a press statement made by Mr. Hikmet Çetin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, on 18 June 1993, regarding a decision on Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights at its 5th plenary meeting, held at Vienna on 15 June 1993 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under items 42 and 115 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement made to the press on 18 June 1993 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey

The World Conference on Human Rights, held at Vienna, appealed to the Security Council on 15 June 1993 to take the necessary measures to end the genocide taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That appeal, which is the first of its kind since the Second World War and the first such document adopted by consensus by the international community recognizing the commission of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is of great importance.

In this connection, the international community would be supporting genocide if it continued unjustly to deny Bosnia and Herzegovina the right to arm itself for the purpose of self-defence.

The continued inaction of the international community against genocide would no doubt deal a heavy blow to international law and legitimacy. The Security Council is obliged to take the necessary action in line with the latest appeal made by the World Conference on Human Rights. Otherwise, neither the World Conference on Human Rights, nor the United Nations and its Member States would be able to maintain credibility and moral authority, and the international community will have to shoulder the blame before history.

Now that the World Conference on Human Rights has determined the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be genocide, it is time that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide be implemented.

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**UNITED NATIONS** **S**

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25987
22 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter addressed to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSCE member States by His Excellency Mr. Hikmet Çetin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, relating to the recent internal developments in Azerbaijan.

I would be grateful if this letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 21 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey addressed to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE member States

As CSCE participating States, we have committed our countries to condemn unreservedly forces which seek to take power from a representative government of a participating State against the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections and contrary to the justly established constitutional order.

We have also solemnly declared that we will support vigorously, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted overthrow of a legitimately elected government of a participating State by undemocratic means, the legitimate organs of that State upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law recognizing their common commitment to countering any attempt to curb these basic values.

The events unfolding in the Republic of Azerbaijan compels us to act in accordance with these CSCE commitments assumed by the Moscow Document 1991. A mutiny by some elements of the Azeri army seeks to overthrow the freely elected President of Azerbaijan, Mr. Ebulfeyz Elcibey. President Elcibey had to leave the capital to avoid civil war and bloodshed but he has emphasized that he remains the head of the legitimate Government of Azerbaijan and will not resign under the threat of force.

Democratic gains in Azerbaijan will be reversed if the freely elected President of the Republic is overthrown by unconstitutional means. All CSCE participating States, individually and collectively, should, in accordance with CSCE commitments, condemn the unconstitutional attempt to take power in Azerbaijan and support the legitimately elected President Elcibey.

I look forward to cooperating with you on this issue.

(Signed) Hikmet ÇETIN
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Turkey

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25988
22 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

# LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In a Presidential statement issued on 8 June 1993, the Security Council strongly condemned the armed attacks against Pakistani and Malaysian contingents of UNTAC which had taken place on 7 June, took note of the Secretariat's preliminary reports on these incidents and requested me to investigate further and to report urgently to the Council.

I wish to inform the Council that, following investigation by its Strategic Investigation Teams, UNTAC has now reported as follows.

On 7 June 1993, at 0415 hours, approximately 170 armed soldiers attacked a platoon of the Pakistani contingent at Phum Tbeng, located in the west of Preah Vihear Province.

The attackers screened their movement behind a herd of cattle and moved up to within 20 to 25 metres of the Pakistani camp. They executed the attack in waves using small arms, mortars and rocket launchers.

The Pakistan battalion troops first warned the attackers not to advance and then responded by employing small arms. The attackers retreated after about two hours, leaving two corpses behind. However, in the exchange of fire, a Pakistani soldier was wounded in the leg. He was later evacuated to UNTAC Field Hospital in Phnom Penh, where amputation of the wounded leg was carried out. Another officer also sustained minor injuries and he was provided first aid on location.

UNTAC's investigation has concluded that the attack had been a deliberate action against UNTAC carried out by elements of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). The two corpses were identified by local villagers as well-known NADK members. Villagers also told UNTAC that, the night before the attack, a group of six NADK soldiers had come to the village to obtain information about the location of UNTAC personnel.

The Pakistani platoon has since been withdrawn from the location.

Also on 7 June, at approximately 2230 hours, a Malaysian battalion platoon, located at Phum Tapoung in Battambang Province, came under fire with small arms and B-40 rockets from all directions, including the west where houses occupied by soldiers of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) are located some

150-250 metres away. A short time earlier a house occupied by Bangladesh Civilian Police Monitors nearby had also been attacked. The Malaysian platoon responded with small arms fire. The attack lasted about 45 minutes. Three Malaysian soldiers were wounded, one seriously. All three were subsequently evacuated.

Although there is no conclusive evidence on the identity of the attackers, UNTAC investigation has strongly indicated, based on the shell casings retrieved and the behaviour of the local CPAF and villagers, that local elements of CPAF had most probably been responsible.

The Malaysian platoon, which had been temporarily deployed to the location during the electoral period, has since been withdrawn from the area.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25989
23 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 11 to 16 June 1993, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi national airspace for the purpose of surveillance and provocation and to drop heat flares.

11 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Shaqlawah.

- At 1300 hours on 11 June 1993, aggressor aircraft dropped two heat flares on the Adnaniyah area south of Kawir township in Irbil governorate.

- At 1135 hours on 11 June 1993, aggressor aircraft dropped two heat flares to the south of the Saddam Dam lake in Ninawa governorate.

(b) Southern region: 51 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih Jalibah and Busayyah.

- At 1340 hours on 11 June 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace south of the Najaf area, flying at a speed of 600 km/h. It disappeared from sight at 1415 hours on the same day.

12 June 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was recorded in this region on 12 June 1993.

(b) Southern region: 57 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qurnah, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

13 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-8,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Basra, Qurnah, Amarah, Shatrah, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Lasaf and Salman.

14 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 24 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Qurnah and Busayyah.

15 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 65 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Basra, Salman and Busayyah.

16 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Irbil and Mosul.

(b) Southern region: 62 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Basra, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Salman and Jalibah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan MALIK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25990
23 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter from Mr. Omar Mustafa Almuntasser, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, concerning the objection by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992) to the procurement of equipment and provision of expert services by the International Atomic Energy Agency for the establishment of a chemical laboratory at Tripoli for the analysis of the impact of agricultural pesticides on human health and animal and plant resources.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. OMAR
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Annex

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) imposing a partial embargo on Libya starting 15 April 1992, we have constantly called attention in our numerous letters to you, the last of which was my letter dated 9 February 1992, to the harm to which the Libyan Arab people has been subject as a result of that resolution.

A look at the successive decisions of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to the said resolution clearly shows that those decisions go beyond the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolution in question, the latest such decision being its failure to approve the creation, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of a laboratory at the Agricultural Research Centre in Tripoli for analysing the impact of agricultural pesticides on human health and animal and plant resources. The decision to set up this project was first taken in the Great Jamahiriya after analyses performed in a number of European laboratories demonstrated to it the failure of agricultural pesticide manufacturing companies to comply with internationally accepted specifications and the failure of suppliers of foodstuffs and fodder to comply with both local and international specifications, thus exposing the health of citizens and of animal and plant resources to considerable harm.

The Great Jamahiriya expresses its profound regret at the adoption of such a decision by the Committee at the insistence of some of its members despite the fact that IAEA informed the Committee on 17 February 1993 that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya desired to create the laboratory and use the services of the Agency's experts, the project being funded by the Great Jamahiriya by means of credits, and that the purpose of the laboratory was to analyse various types of agricultural pesticides, to check the reliability of the information provided by manufacturers regarding the concentration of the active principle (the component which kills pests, pathogens and weeds) and its suitability for its intended uses, and to measure the level of concentration of pesticide residues in or on fruit, vegetables, grain and fodder. Moreover, the IAEA presented an ample explanation of the project, the equipment and the related purposes in addition to presenting further clarifications in answer to inquiries of the Committee, including the following:

1. On 2 December 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency approved for other countries six technical assistance projects, all of which are similar to the Libyan request in terms of purpose, which is ultimately the protection, in general, of human health and animal, plant and environmental resources, to which the United Nations and its specialized agencies devote particular attention.

2. All the equipment required for the project is analytical equipment, none of which can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons; IAEA has provided explanations to the Committee with technical details on that equipment.

His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations

3. The persons who will be using the equipment are laboratory chemists who work in the pesticide analytical chemistry laboratories at the Agricultural Research Centre attached to the Ministry of Agriculture. The IAEA experts submitted ample scientifically based explanations, yet the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 totally disregarded the Agency's explanations, nor did it discuss in earnest their content or objectively examine the importance of the project to a developing country in dire need of protecting its citizens and its animal and plant resources. This leads us to draw attention once again to the following points:

(a) The decision adopted by the Committee owing to the obstinacy of the United States, Great Britain and France is a high-handed, discriminatory measure that is devoid of any logical or legal basis and must be deemed a flagrant transgression of the letter and the spirit of Security Council resolution 748.

(b) We hold the Committee responsible for any repercussions and harm that may result from its failure to approve the said project with regard to either the health of the citizens of the Jamahiriya or animal and plant resources and we appeal to the Security Council to review the Committee's decision.

(c) We reserve the right of the Great Jamahiriya and its people to bring this issue before the competent international organizations and agencies (the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Council, IAEA and humanitarian organizations) and to consider the stand taken by the Security Council Committee in refusing to allow the implementation of such a project as reflecting a discriminatory attitude against a Member State to deprive it of its right to take advantage of the technical cooperation programmes of agencies as other Member States do.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a small developing country that believes in cooperation with all States based on mutual respect and the achievement of common benefits. Consequently, it cannot condone the use of political pressure and inhumane means by certain countries as a tool for achieving political goals that are far from the noble objectives of the Charter of the United Nations; yet the decision adopted by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 against the Jamahiriya and its people in connection with the project referred to above is but a living example of the policy of double standards in dealing with Member States.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya sets great store by continued cooperation with international organizations and trusts that you will use your good offices to ensure the continuation of that cooperation.

(Signed) Omar Mustafa ALMUNTASSER
Secretary of the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and
International Cooperation

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**UNITED NATIONS** **S**

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25991
23 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the current month of June, I have the honour to transmit herewith resolution No. 5272 of the Council of the League of Arab States, adopted at its ninety-ninth ordinary session, concerning the occupied Syrian Arab Golan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the annexed resolution circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan S. ABU ODEH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
to the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

Annex

The occupied Syrian Arab Golan

The Council of the League,

Having taken cognizance of the note by the General Secretariat and the recommendation of the Committee on Political Affairs,

Following with concern and alarm the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Arab Golan and Israel's persistence in its refusal to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy and its failure to submit to the will of the international community, which regards Israel's occupation and its decision to annex the Syrian Arab Golan null and void and without validity,

Having studied the situation in the occupied Syrian Arab Golan in the light of the Israeli occupation authorities' practices, which are contrary to the United Nations Charter, international conventions, international legitimacy and United Nations resolutions,

Having recalled its earlier resolutions and international resolutions affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,

Decides:

1. To reaffirm its resolution No. 4126 of 13 February 1982 and its subsequent resolutions, the most recent being its resolution No. 5217 of 13 September 1992, rejecting all the measures taken now or in the past by the Israeli occupation authorities with the objective of altering the legal, natural and demographic status of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan; to regard the Israeli measures for imposing its rule on it as illegal and null and void and as constituting a violation of international conventions and of the United Nations Charter and resolutions, in particular, Security Council resolution 497 (1981), General Assembly resolution 47/63 of 11 December 1992, which affirmed that Israel's decision of 14 December 1981 to annex the occupied Syrian Arab Golan is null and void and that the Knesset decision of 14 December 1981 on this matter is null and void and has no validity whatsoever;

2. To call upon the Security Council to assume its responsibilities and compel Israel to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy calling for full withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Arab Golan and to support the Syrian Government in its efforts to put these resolutions into effect;

3. To support the steadfastness of the Syrian Arab citizens; to back them in their defiance of the Israeli occupation and its repressive practices and in their adhesion to their land and their Syrian Arab identity; and to affirm the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to the citizens of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan;

4. To call upon the international community, and the United States in particular, to prevail upon Israel to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and other international organizations concerning full withdrawal from the Golan and other occupied Arab territories.

(R.5272 - OS(99) - M4 - 19 April 1992)

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25992
24 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 JUNE 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of fresh violations by the Iranian side of the provisions governing the cease-fire and the area of separation between the two countries during the period 5 to 18 June 1993.

1. At 0835 hours on 5 June 1993, a group of an estimated 10 persons from the Iranian side was observed carrying out maintenance work on slit-trench positions at coordinates 517506 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

2. At 0845 hours on 7 June 1993, four persons from the Iranian side wearing military uniforms were observed coming from the Iranian rear. They installed a 60-mm mortar and a PKC gun at coordinates 420563, opposite Iraqi units, inside the area of separation and in front of the Saddam post.

3. At 1200 hours on 7 June 1993, the Iranian side proceeded to build four new positions at the Iranian location at coordinates 420523 inside the area of separation opposite the Saddam post.

4. At 1735 hours on 7 June 1993, 15 Iranian soldiers were observed building a mud hut inside the area of separation at coordinates 514501 opposite the Fakkah post.

5. At 2000 hours on 7 June 1993, 30 Iranian troops were observed while engaged in medium-weapons and small-arms training at coordinates 512502 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

6. At 0840 hours on 8 June 1993, a group of an estimated 10 Iranian soldiers was observed carrying out maintenance work on the barbed wire at coordinates 512502 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

7. At 1730 hours on 9 June 1993, a group of persons from the Iranian side was observed building a hut at coordinates 514501 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

8. At 2000 hours on 9 June 1993, a group of an estimated 50 persons from the Iranian side was observed while engaged in small-arms training at coordinates 512502 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

9. At 0800 hours on 10 June 1993, 10 Iranian soldiers were observed carrying out maintenance work on positions at coordinates 514501 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

10. At 0810 hours on 10 June 1993, 15 Iranian soldiers were observed building a firing position of sandbags at coordinates 512502 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

11. At 0850 hours on 11 June 1993, two khaki-coloured helicopters were observed flying at an altitude of 300 metres at coordinates 518529 opposite the Fakkah post. They flew through the air for a period of 30 minutes, heading from the Iranian rear towards the Iranian Battalion. They landed at 0930 hours at coordinates 5751 opposite the above-mentioned post, and five minutes later took off towards the Iranian rear.

12. At 2000 hours on 13 June 1993, an Iranian force estimated at infantry section strength attempted to infiltrate across the international boundary at coordinates 539917 and was intercepted by the Iraqi force stationed at the Tahrir post. The clash, in which small arms and launchers were used, continued for 10 minutes before the Iranian force took flight.

13. At 0840 hours on 13 June 1993, a group of an estimated 20 armed soldiers from the Iranian side was observed to be deployed at coordinates 512502 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

14. At 0220 hours on 14 June 1993, intermittent bursts from a medium machine-gun were heard being fired in the direction of Iraqi units from coordinates 514501 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

15. At 0840 hours on 15 June 1993, a group of an estimated 35 Iranian soldiers was observed carrying out maintenance work on bunkers at coordinates 514501 inside the area of separation opposite the Fakkah post.

16. At 0120 hours on 16 June 1993, a group of an estimated 30 Iranians approached the Sakiban mound (formerly the Sakiban post) at coordinates 505819 and opened fire with rifles and mortars, killing one of those manning the mound and wounding another.

17. At 0845 hours on 16 June 1993, 10 Iranian soldiers were observed building a position to the left of the Iranian location at coordinates 7123 inside the area of separation opposite the Shib post.

18. At 1000 hours on 16 June 1993, an Iranian helicopter was observed opposite the Naft-e-Shah area at coordinates 447608. Ten minutes later, it took off in the direction of the Iranian rear.

19. At 2300 hours on 16 June 1993, the Iranian side fired small-arms rounds from coordinates 5083 opposite the Sakiban post in the direction of Wadyan. At the same time, an RPG-7 rocket was heard exploding opposite the Firyal post at coordinates 4985 inside the area of separation.

20. At 0550 hours on 18 June 1993, the Iranian side installed a communications station at coordinates 503533 opposite the Fakkah post inside the area of separation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan MALIK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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# FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 815 (1993)

## INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 23 of my report of 15 May 1993 (S/25777) relating to the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), I expressed the view that it was not advisable for me at that time to recommend that the Security Council adopt one of the three options I had outlined in paragraph 20 of that report. I stated that, before making a recommendation to the Council about the future of UNPROFOR in Croatia, I would prefer to await a report from my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, who was about to visit the area. The present report is now submitted, following advice received from Mr. Stoltenberg, to provide the Council with a recommendation relating to the mandate of UNPROFOR, the renewal of which would, as members of the Council are aware, apply to all the republics of the former Yugoslavia in which UNPROFOR is deployed. Ongoing activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to warrant an extension of the Force's mandate in those countries; the present report therefore focuses primarily on UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia.

## I. FUTURE OF UNPROFOR

2. As I stated in my report of 10 February 1993 (S/25264), a sound basis will not exist for renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia unless two factors are addressed: the failure by the parties, and in particular the Serb side, to permit implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan; and the failure of both parties to cooperate in establishing a political process that would offer the prospect of an early agreed settlement to the conflict between them. Although intensive efforts have been made by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR, no significant progress has occurred in either case.

3. At the same time, it is clear that the presence of UNPROFOR is indispensable to control of the conflict, which continues to simmer, and sometimes boil over, in Croatia and to the fostering of a climate in which negotiations between the parties can be promoted. The role of UNPROFOR in present circumstances is thus to prevent the resumption or escalation of conflict; to provide a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the

peacemakers; and to support the provision of essential humanitarian assistance to the victims of the ongoing conflict. Without prejudice to its basic mandate of implementing the agreed peace-keeping plan, UNPROFOR's continued presence can be justified at least by these functions. The termination of its mandate would, in the judgement of the Co-Chairmen, risk the resumption of a major conflict in the region and cause severe adverse consequences for humanitarian relief operations.

4. It should also be noted that the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia does not only fulfil a role in respect of the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs). In Sector East and in Dalmatia, the UNPROFOR presence plays an important deterrent and mediating role between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In other areas of Croatia, UNPROFOR's presence provides an operational link to contiguous areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, UNPROFOR's logistics bases at Zagreb and Split are indispensable to its ability to support its operations inside Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. In view of the above considerations, I have, for the moment, rejected the option of withdrawing the Force from Croatia (S/25777, para. 20 (a)). The option of enforcement action remains impracticable for the reasons set out in my earlier report (S/25777, para. 20 (b)). This leaves me with no option other than that of leaving UNPROFOR in place, with its existing mandate, and doing so in the hope that a changing international environment will facilitate and bring to fruition intensified peacemaking efforts by the Co-Chairmen, with the support of UNPROFOR.

6. I am conscious that the exercise of this option would fall short of the wish expressed by the Government of Croatia that the renewal of the mandate should take place only in conditions that equip the Force to enforce its mandate against the Serb side in accordance with a specific timetable. Since I do not consider the targets proposed by the Croatian authorities to be realizable in the short run without the active cooperation of the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs and pink zones, I have asked my Special Representative to seek the consent of the Government of Croatia to a limited further extension of UNPROFOR's mandate by three months. If this consent is not granted, I shall report the matter to the Security Council for appropriate decision.

7. In this connection, I should like to stress that UNPROFOR has been performing a difficult task with courage and determination amidst seriously deteriorating conditions, both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR soldiers have increasingly been targeted by all sides, and severe restrictions are placed upon their freedom of movement. UNPROFOR has incurred over 500 casualties, including 46 fatalities, in the 14 months of its deployment, of which 246 and 25, respectively, have occurred in Croatia. Attacks upon humanitarian convoys have become more frequent and indiscriminate, threatening the courageous efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations. Should the threats to the safety and security of United Nations personnel, which have already reached unacceptable levels, mount further, I would have to inform the Council that a viable basis for their functioning no longer existed.

8. I should also like to recall that UNPROFOR's deployment embodies the will of the international community to help the parties to arrive at an overall

settlement of their conflict. In turn, it is the responsibility of the parties to demonstrate by their conduct that they are seriously committed to pursuing the path of peace. Should it become apparent that this is not the case, I do not believe it would be a worthwhile use of the limited resources of the United Nations to maintain a peace-keeping operation where it had become clear that there was no peace to keep.

## II. OBSERVATIONS

9. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNPROFOR by a further three months, to 30 September 1993. Significant progress will be required in the peacemaking efforts of the Co-Chairmen if any further renewal is to be contemplated beyond that date.

10. In recommending this extension, it is my duty to call once again upon Member States to honour their financial obligations to UNPROFOR. Reimbursements to troop-contributing States remain several months behind schedule, a problem that has been cited by several of them in declining invitations to participate in other United Nations peace-keeping operations or even to maintain and enlarge their contingents in UNPROFOR. I do not believe it would be responsible of me to recommend further extensions of UNPROFOR if the material resources required for its effective functioning are not forthcoming from Member States.

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